Why I'm an atheist

[sarahmichigan]

This is going to be kind of anti-climactic since I've been thinking on it for a while and leading up to it, and yet it's going to be short. But here goes.

I'm an atheist because I think the burden of proof is on those who believe in ANY kind of supernatural phenomena. As far as I can tell, material, natural explanations explain the world and how it works and how it came into being just fine.

To me, positing a Higher Being (especially the more specific you get about what this being is like) to explain things is like saying that tiny black fairies contort their bodies to show the time on my digital watch rather than relying on naturalistic, material explantions about electricity and such.

Now, I understand why some people have an intuition that there just MUST be something bigger than us that created the world. That's fine, and I can understand that. (I have trouble figuring out, sometimes, how people go from "some higher being" to "my specific sect or doctrine," but that's another subject.) However, I don't have that intuition.

I remember when I was taking philosophy courses at Western Michigan University, and sometimes the professor would ask, "What's your intuition about that statment or assertion?" This was in the context of many philosophical arguments, not just ones about the existence or non-existence of God. I remember thinking, "Intuition?! This is supposed to be a philosophy course, and not a New Age class about how to fine-tune your ESP."

But really, when it comes to belief in a higher being of some sort, I think a lot of us are going off our gut feeling. My gut says that only the material world exists, and there isn't anything "super" above the natural world. Any weirdness that can't be explained by science can usually be explained by psychology.

Comments

[tacit.livejournal.com]

In context of the example, my assertion is that -- if there truly is no evidence either way -- then whether or not there is a green spotted dragon living in Lake Michigan is of no consequence... and therefore, belief that it is present is no more or less "valid" than belief that it is not.

That's not the way I would use the word "valid." To me, an idea is "valid" or not based on one and only one criterion: how closely it reflects the actual state of the world. If no evidence exists for or against the green spotted dragon, then we may not be able to determine which belief is the more valid--but that's not the same thing as saying both are equally valid!

As in my response to sarahmichigan above, this "valid" is not the "valid" of logical terminology, because in the discipline of logic, conventions like Ockham's Razor dictate that we bias the evaluation of equally-sufficient hypotheses toward those that are "simpler" or "more ordinary". In more conceptual sense, however, if these biases are removed, there's no reason to assume one hypothesis is superior to the other.

Logic does not make an idea valid or invalid; logic is a tool which is used to determine whether or not it already is valid or invalid. It's not the logic that gives an idea its validity; the idea's validity comes from whether or not it accurately reflects reality. Logic simply offers one way to test whether it accurately reflects reality, that's all.

To apply this bias is, of course, perfectly reasonable -- i would not find fault in anyone for leaning toward the hypothesis that there is not a dragon in Lake Michigan. However, all i wish to assert is that doing so is, in effect, to apply a statement of faith: that the observable patterns that led to conventions like Ockham's Razor should also apply to the unobservable.

Direct observation isn't the only tool that can be used to establish whether or not something exists, and forming an idea about the existence of the green spotted dragon in the lake in the absence of seeing it is not always an act of faith. Evidence can be indirect; for example, the most compelling evidence against the notion of the Loch Ness Monster comes from observations that Loch Ness is a completely landlocked lake with very low available biomass, and hence insufficient food to support a breeding population of creatures whose body mass is claimed to be int he thousands of kilometers; and from the fact that if these creatures exist, one would expect to see the bloated, decaying carcasses of dead sea monsters wash up on the beach from time to time. Indirect evidence is still evidence; direct observation is not the only evidence we have.

In the case f the green spotted dragon in the lake, it might be tempting to believe that we have no evidence either way, so we must decide based on faith. But this is not so. We have an enormous body of evidence which supports models that make predictions like "all animals must eat," "all animals eventually die," "large animals must eat more than small animals," and "stable populations of animals require a certain number of individuals in order to remain stable." We can then apply those predictions o make additional predictions, such as "if there is a green spotted dragon in the lake, it is reasonable to assume it must eat," and then begin searching not only for direct observations of the green spotted dragon, but for things it might eat as well.

If someone comes along and says "green spotted dragons have metabolisms based on magic, and so never eat" and "green spotted dragons are immortal" and "green spotted dragons can become invisible when they choose," we now enter the realm in which the arguments in favor of the green spotted dragon are extraordinary indeed (and contradict a massive body of evidence which says that organisms do not have these properties), and so the burden of proof is now once again shifted to people who make claims that it is possible for organisms to live by magic and without food, and it is possible for large macroscopic organisms to become invisible at will.

[bernmarx.livejournal.com]

To me, an idea is "valid" or not based on one and only one criterion: how closely it reflects the actual state of the world.

I think this represents an important point of philosophical divergence between atheists and agnostics (and this is an oversimplification): An atheist is seeking to determine all aspects about the universe, even the parts that do not affect his existence, while an agnostic is primarily seeking to determine the aspects that affect him (directly or indirectly). For me, a lot of the stuff about the Big Bang is, "That's neat, but so?" -- unless it can be tied to how I live, how I interact with others, how others interact with me, etc., it's just interesting tidbits (and yes, I know there are ways that the Big Bang affects such things, but much of it doesn't).

I feel that what people believe, spiritually, is only relevant to me if it affects how they interact with me, and especially in a negative way. There are others (theists and atheists alike) who seem to think that merely believing something incorrect is dangerous in and of itself, and I disagree with that. If someone wants to believe that Jesus rose from the grave, and as a result of that belief the person treats me with compassion and respect, groovy... if as a result of that belief the person mocks me and snubs me for not believing it as well, not groovy.

[tacit.livejournal.com]

One could look at the history of the world and construct a pretty compelling argument that believing things on faith is, on the balance, more harmful than it is constructive--because we are human beings, and the things that human beings believe are not easily detached from the things that human beings believe are good for their neighbors. As soon as you create a space in your brain and say "This space is reserved fr ideas that I accept without evidence," then you make yourself vulnerable to anyone who can manipulate any idea he chooses into that space. By creating a precedent for believing things without proof, you set yourself up to be controlled by people who can persuade you to believe the things they want you to believe without proof, such as "it does not matter how much you must torture so-and-so to get him to confess his sins, because the earthly torture he undergoes is nothing compared to the eternal hellfire he will experience if he does not," or "gays are inherently inferior to straights and God commands that they be stoned."

Without faith, good people do good things and evil people do evil things. Getting a good person to do evil things requires faith.

[bernmarx.livejournal.com]

By creating a precedent for believing things without proof, you set yourself up to be controlled by people who can persuade you to believe the things they want you to believe without proof

I disagree for several reasons.

First, there's proof for very few things; there's evidence for a great many things. That's one of them Scientist Caveats I was talking about elsewhere. ;)

But I don't think anyone really accepts things without evidence. What differs from person to person is what qualifies as acceptable evidence. For some, "evidence" includes "it's in the Bible" or "it sounds right to me" or "I had a dream about it" -- all of these are faith, but don't necessarily set those people up for every charlatan that comes down the pike.

Sure, some really terrible, gory, horrendous things have been done in the history of humanity in the name of God. Some really terrible things have been done with guns, definitely more bad things than good things... is the problem the gun? I don't think so.

Without faith, good people do good things and evil people do evil things.

This relies on the assumption that there are inherently good people and inherently evil people. I reject this assumption without evidence, and set the burden of proof for its truth on you.

[http://users.livejournal.com/_earthshine_/]

Yes... i agree with your assertions re validity. "Valid" isn't the right word, because it implies a context of logically supportable truth, which is already within the realm of convention. Sorry for that... i'm having trouble finding the word I mean.

Better might be to try to continue the example:

If someone comes along and says "green spotted dragons have metabolisms based on magic, and so never eat" and ... and so the burden of proof is now once again shifted to people who make claims that it is possible for organisms to live by magic and without food, and it is possible for large macroscopic organisms to become invisible at will.

Yes... i agree that within the context of the scientific community, you're absolutely right. I would not support anyone adding this magical immortal invisible dragon to textbooks, thereby implicitly claiming that an organism with these properties is confirmed to exist in the same manner that others have been. Similarly, i do not support anyone teaching ID or creationism or any similar concept in a science class, or in any context that suggests that these ideas are founded on the same scientific basis that evolution is.

But, despite its very very expansive context and very very wide breadth of utility, scientific method is a discipline; it is an institutionalized subset of all possible understandings of reality that has been agreed upon and established because of its utility and wide applicability.

When we leave that subset, the very concepts of things like "burden of proof" vanish. What we are left with is a simple pair of hypotheses:

A) There is no dragon, and its absence explains the lack of evidence for its presence via consistency with established theories, observations and scientific method.

B) There is a dragon, and its earth-shakingly extraordinary properties explain the lack of evidence for its presence within the context of the scientific method.

My suggestion is that outside of the scientific discipline, in the purely open-ended philosophical context, neither of these hypotheses is better at the task of "accurately reflect[ing] reality".

Within the scientific discipline, however, there is convention. This convention is based on the fact that, in the past, consistently more useful results come from efforts that adhere to it. By this convention, hypotheses are not accepted as "true" (or "valid"?) until they have been tested and proven via established/accepted methods. Furthermore, while there is also no such proof that hypothesis #A is true, convention dictates that it is the "safer" and more useful default position, because it is "simpler" and/or lies more probabilistically in line with similar hypotheses that have been proven. It's accepted as a better estimator of reality.

I believe the confusion arises when people use that word -- "reality". I offer the following three interpretations:

1) "reality" = "scientific/reasonable reality": Id est, it is the world that scientific method allows all parties employing it to consistently and repeatably observe.

2) "reality" = "personal reality": Id est, the understanding of the nature of the universe that a person holds.

3) "reality" = "absolute/true reality": Id est, the nature of the universe as it is, regardless of observability or individual belief.

(cont'd next comment -- too long!) :)

(cont'd...)

[http://users.livejournal.com/_earthshine_/]

Some people choose to strictly and fully synchronize their #2 to #1. They believe that #1 is "all there is". This leads to the natural conclusion that #3 is equal to #1. This is a choice, and it does have a massive advantage: it automatically allows them to share a personal reality (#2) with all others who have done the same, and allows them to function without ever conflicting with the wide breadth of understanding and utility offered by #1.

However, i repeat: this is a choice... or dare i take it a step further, and say that it is an act of faith. Now, this isn't the kind of faith the carries the connotations of God or religion or FSM silliness with it -- i don't mean to suggest that. But, in the strict sense, it is faith: it is the arbitrary selection of a set of ultimately improvable assumptions to establish a personal reality (#2).

By contrast of example, there are others that select a #2 that totally conflicts with #1. These are people who believe that #3 includes things that directly contradict science, and they live with the consequences of that. Some do so peacefully (no harm, no foul, i guess) while others zealously try to convince others to join them (annoying, sometimes harmful) or perhaps even persecute those who disagree with them (harmful and intolerant).

Then, there are many (i think) who have a #2 that is not the same as #1, but also does not conflict with its conclusions. This is something i personally endeavor to do. I believe in the discipline of science/reason, its uses, its very wide context, and its excellent utility as a common ground for working with others (it's probably the best and only real option for that, as universal "common grounds" go). But i do not believe that the #1 is all there is to #3; i try to maintain a #2 that is a superset of #1, believing it to be part of #3, but not that it tells the whole story about #3.


OK, sorry i digressed a little there in the hopes it might help clarify my thoughts.

My point, though, was to suggest that using "burden of proof" or "Ockham's Razor" or similar idea as a basis for "hard atheism" (the belief that there is no God and/or supernatural phenomena) is a judgement call. To say that it is somehow "closer to reality" because of this basis is to propose that true reality (#3) is equal to #1, which is to assert that one has synched their understanding of it (#2) to #1, which is to operate from a standpoint that is already based on an act of faith. That's what i mean to say when i ask if it is a kind of circular argument.

Is that clearer as to what i mean?

Also, i want to close by re-addressing that i'm not meaning to imply any superiority or inferiority of one faith over another here. I truly do respect the belief that there is no God -- the synching of #1 and #2. I seek only to validate my claim that that belief is a belief which, in a neutral philosophical context, is no more or less apt at reflecting true reality (#3) than any other.

Thanks again to all for this discussion!

Re: (cont'd...)

[tacit.livejournal.com]

By contrast of example, there are others that select a #2 that totally conflicts with #1. These are people who believe that #3 includes things that directly contradict science, and they live with the consequences of that. Some do so peacefully (no harm, no foul, i guess) while others zealously try to convince others to join them (annoying, sometimes harmful) or perhaps even persecute those who disagree with them (harmful and intolerant).

I don't believe that even in the best cases, people who live with beliefs that directly contradict science are "no harm, no foul." Such beliefs do have an effect; they impact society in a number of ways, some of them subtle and others not so subtle. People act in accordance with what they believe to be true, not what is actually true, and people who believe things without evidence at best open the door to those skilled at manipulating those beliefs. A person who believes X without evidence will also often believe Y without evidence if he or she can be persuaded that Y is a consequence of X.

And unfortunately, some times that may indirectly involve people in harmful things even if they themselves do not believe in harmful ways. It may be a matter of donating money to the local church, whose board of directors work for laws barring blacks from marrying whites. It may be in simply turning the other way when someone else who holds similar beliefs acts in destructive ways. It may be even more passive than that, such as not supporting (or even wanting to think about) things which might threaten the unsupported belief.

My point, though, was to suggest that using "burden of proof" or "Ockham's Razor" or similar idea as a basis for "hard atheism" (the belief that there is no God and/or supernatural phenomena) is a judgement call.

I do think that some people create a distinction between "things which can be evaluated empirically" and "things which can not," and attempt to put religion into the category of "things which can not be evaluated empirically." Such people will often say that using logic, evidence, or Ockham's Razor to evaluate claims of the supernatural misses the point, and that such attempts are using the wrong tool for the job.

Yet these same people will, often as not, then seek to have it both ways, and to make empirical claims based on their untestable, non-empirical beliefs--"God healed my Aunt Rosie's cancer," "God helped me get a promotion at work." Statements like these are empirical claims, and as empirical claims are subject to empirical analysis. (If God was the agent of Aunt Rosie's recovery, why does God play favorites? Why did God not cure Sue's cancer, when Sue lived a more virtuous life than Aunt Rosie? And what about Uncle Carl, who was a right royal bastard who despised God and everything religion stands for, yet whose cancer also went into remission? And if God can cure cancer, which sometimes goes into remission on its own anyway, why can God not make the war veteran whose leg was amputated grow a new leg--is that outside God's ability?)

You can't have it both ways--claiming that religion is outside the realm of empirical evidence or reason, then simultaneously making empirical claims to support a religious belief--yet that is, it seems to me, most often precisely what happens when people try to separate the realm of faith from the realm of empirical fact.

Re: (cont'd...)

[http://users.livejournal.com/_earthshine_/]

Fair points all. My thoughts are more correllaries than disagreements, i think.

I don't believe that even in the best cases, people who live with beliefs that directly contradict science are "no harm, no foul." Such beliefs do have an effect; they impact society in a number of ways, some of them subtle and others not so subtle.

This is undeniable. What we believe affects what we do, and everything we do -- in at least some infinitessimal way -- affects everyone else.

My thoughts on this, though, is that i don't necessarily feel this is a bad thing. Yes, people do all kinds of negative things in the name of what i'll call "non-scientific" (meaning "incompatible with reality #1") belief. I think many also do positive things, though, in both small and large ways. Similarly, while non-scientific beliefs can make people susceptible to manipulation, it can at other times make them more impervious to it. Belief-based organizations can amass resources and use them for bad ends, but thoroughly rational organizations also do that all the time, too.

I think what's important here is that people endeavor to do the same with their non-scientific beliefs as they would seek to do with their rational pursuits: keep their effects positive. This is why i believe far more in the importance of compassion than i do in any one flavor of spirituality, or in the fruits of science/logic. I believe its important that anyone, regardless of deist, agnostic or atheist philosophies, check those ways of life against the metric of compassion. If a church that claims to be based on Christ's teachings (which were very much about compassion and philos) is making political moves to hurt people, then the people of that church must speak up. Similarly, if the progress of technology that is claimed to be for the good of all is coming at a human cost somewhere, it needs to be checked.

Those who sync their #2 with #1 do have the advantage that they can operate on a huge common ground of established purely rational thought. Maybe this gives an automatic edge when dealing with others, and perhaps that edge could be thought of as compassionate. Saying, though, that making decisions firmly grounded only in reason prevents people from being manipulated, misguided or evil is a big stretch, though; with complex issues like social decisions and advanced technological questions, there is plenty of room for the base axioms/criteria upon which the logical process is based to differ wildly between people and cause the same kinds of problems.

You can't have it both ways-- ...

Yes, i agree. If you want to step into the discipline of science, you need to play by that discipline's rules. One can say "God healed my Aunt Rosie's cancer," but if so, it must be accepted that this is a statement of faith, and you can't expect others (whose beliefs may differ) to agree with you. When someone steps outside of the self, they are stepping outside of their #2, and it's critical to recognize that. Often (but not always), one can at least count on #1 as a starting ground for discussion, and people can share #2s, but they can't just expect another person to buy into it.

Sadly, as you said, this often happens anyway. :) I don't mean to suggest that i espouse that.

I guess my question is more on this part:

Such people will often say that using logic, evidence, or Ockham's Razor to evaluate claims of the supernatural misses the point, and that such attempts are using the wrong tool for the job.

How do you feel about this statement, independent of the people who misuse it, i mean? Do you think the point i was trying to make is a sound one in this independent sense, or is there something about it that seems unsound to you?