Okay... let me run a bit with this example... again, only to share ideas (i'm not trying to "convert" or insult anyone here -- it's good to "meet" you, and i've talked with dare2grok before and respect his perspectives as well).
The thesis i'd like to suggest for your (plural) review is this:
To assign "burden of proof" at all is to implicity apply a convention (logical/scientific process) that itself implies a suggestion of belief (that the "more ordinary" is true unless there is evidence otherwise -- "Ockham's Razor"?).
In context of the example, my assertion is that -- if there truly is no evidence either way -- then whether or not there is a green spotted dragon living in Lake Michigan is of no consequence... and therefore, belief that it is present is no more or less "valid" than belief that it is not.
As in my response to sarahmichigan above, this "valid" is not the "valid" of logical terminology, because in the discipline of logic, conventions like Ockham's Razor dictate that we bias the evaluation of equally-sufficient hypotheses toward those that are "simpler" or "more ordinary". In more conceptual sense, however, if these biases are removed, there's no reason to assume one hypothesis is superior to the other.
To apply this bias is, of course, perfectly reasonable -- i would not find fault in anyone for leaning toward the hypothesis that there is not a dragon in Lake Michigan. However, all i wish to assert is that doing so is, in effect, to apply a statement of faith: that the observable patterns that led to conventions like Ockham's Razor should also apply to the unobservable.
My suggestion is that a person truly applying no assertions of faith into the situation would treat both hypotheses equally, and simply state that either could be true, and neither bears more "burden of proof" than the other ...until one chooses to analyze the questions within the discipline of logic, which carries certain faiths (axioms, conventions, etc.) with it.
This is a difficult idea for me to articulate, but that's my first attempt. :) I welcome thoughts and questions from all, and will try to clarify as we go if need be.
no subject
The thesis i'd like to suggest for your (plural) review is this:
To assign "burden of proof" at all is to implicity apply a convention (logical/scientific process) that itself implies a suggestion of belief (that the "more ordinary" is true unless there is evidence otherwise -- "Ockham's Razor"?).
In context of the example, my assertion is that -- if there truly is no evidence either way -- then whether or not there is a green spotted dragon living in Lake Michigan is of no consequence... and therefore, belief that it is present is no more or less "valid" than belief that it is not.
As in my response to
To apply this bias is, of course, perfectly reasonable -- i would not find fault in anyone for leaning toward the hypothesis that there is not a dragon in Lake Michigan. However, all i wish to assert is that doing so is, in effect, to apply a statement of faith: that the observable patterns that led to conventions like Ockham's Razor should also apply to the unobservable.
My suggestion is that a person truly applying no assertions of faith into the situation would treat both hypotheses equally, and simply state that either could be true, and neither bears more "burden of proof" than the other ...until one chooses to analyze the questions within the discipline of logic, which carries certain faiths (axioms, conventions, etc.) with it.
This is a difficult idea for me to articulate, but that's my first attempt.
:)I welcome thoughts and questions from all, and will try to clarify as we go if need be.